CHIRP // AUTHv0.4.1
CHIRP · AUTH // PRIVACY

Privacy
in plain text.

Last updated 2026-11-20. Chirp is operated by Stackwell Labs LLC. Questions: privacy@chirpauth.com.

What we collect

There are three places data can live: on our servers, on your device, or nowhere. Here's what is in each.

Stored on our servers

Here is everything we would return if you asked for a copy of your data, after signing up as janesmith@example.com, registering a passkey, signing into one app, and using the service for a few minutes. In our database the same information is split across several rows; we have combined it here for clarity.

{
  "user": {
    "user_id":    "usr_a3f7c891b4e84d2c9f6012345678901a",
    "email":      "janesmith@example.com",
    "created_at": "2026-05-28T21:14:00Z"
  },
  "passkeys": [
    {
      "passkey_id":    "pk_a3f7c891b4e84d2c9f6012345678901a",
      "derived_name":  "Passkey on macOS",
      "custom_label":  null,
      "public_key":    "MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgK...",
      "created_at":    "2026-05-28T21:15:00Z",
      "last_used_at":  "2026-05-28T22:30:00Z"
    }
  ],
  "sessions": [
    {
      "token":        "bs_a3f7c891...90ab",
      "created_at":   "2026-05-28T21:14:00Z",
      "last_seen_at": "2026-05-28T22:30:00Z",
      "expires_at":   "2026-06-27T21:14:00Z"
    }
  ],
  "consents": [
    {
      "app_id":      "pigeon",
      "app_name":    "Pigeon",
      "scopes":      ["openid"],
      "approved_at": "2026-05-28T21:16:00Z"
    }
  ],
  "events": [
    {
      "event":    "login.success",
      "at":       "2026-05-28T21:14:00Z",
      "result":   "success",
      "detail":   "id_token",
      "trace_id": "trc_d2f3e4..."
    },
    {
      "event":  "login.email_step.started",
      "at":     "2026-05-28T21:13:50Z",
      "detail": ""
    }
  ]
}

Each field broken out:

Field Example What it is How long
user.user_id usr_a3f7c891… Opaque random account id. Internal stable handle that survives email changes; not derived from your email. Until you delete your account.
user.email janesmith@example.com The identifier you sign in with. Where we send magic-link emails. Until you delete your account.
user.created_at 2026-05-28T21:14:00Z When you first signed up. Until you delete your account.
passkeys[] { derived_name, custom_label, public_key, dates } A passkey you registered. derived_name is auto-set at registration time to one of a small fixed list ("Passkey on macOS", "Passkey on iOS", etc.), computed from the OS family in your User-Agent. The raw User-Agent is read once for this and then discarded. custom_label is null by default; only populated if you explicitly rename the passkey on the account page. The public key is what we verify your sign-in signatures against; the private key never leaves your device. Until you remove the passkey.
sessions[] { token, method, dates } A browser session record — one per browser you have signed in from. Lets you stay signed in and lets you list and revoke sessions. method is how you signed in (email link, passkey, phone approval or recovery code), so you can tell your sign-ins apart. No IP or browser fingerprint is attached. 30 days absolute, 14-day idle — whichever first.
consents[] { app_id, app_name, scopes, approved_at } A relying app you have approved, its name when you last signed in to it, and the scopes you granted. Saved so we do not re-prompt on every sign-in, and so your connected apps can still name an app after its developer retires it. Until you revoke consent.
events[] (security) { event, at, result, detail, trace_id } Sign-ins, account changes, passkey additions, changes to apps you own, etc. For incident response, and so you can see what was done on your account: the events filed under it are in your account export and at GET /api/account/activity. detail is a short note: a fixed token like "id_token" or "resend", sometimes with ids such as an account id or an app’s client id. Never an email address, IP or browser fingerprint. 14 days, or 90 days for events recorded while the account they are filed under is on the Pro plan.
events[] (trace) { event, at, detail } Per-request diagnostic trace, for debugging when something goes wrong. The trace id (shown on error pages) is the storage key, not a stored field. No IP or browser fingerprint. 14 days.
pending_magic_link (transient) not present in this snapshot A row that exists only between your clicking "send me a sign-in link" and your clicking the link in the email. Lets us verify the click came from the right inbox. Usable more than once within the window, then deleted after 10 minutes — not consumed when you click it.
rate_limit_counter (transient) RL#login.email#sha256(your_ip)#1748468040 A per-IP counter that lets us reject brute-force sign-in floods. Your IP is SHA-256 hashed before becoming part of the key; the counter never holds the raw IP. Auto-deleted after 2 minutes.
monthly_active (billing) your export lists the months you were counted, never which developers counted you For each developer, the set of user ids that signed in to any of their apps in a calendar month (UTC). It is how paid tiers are counted and capped in monthly active identities. Your opaque id only — no email, no timestamps, no count of sign-ins. No automatic expiry. Deleted when that developer deletes their Chirp account. Sign-ins to Chirp itself (your account page or dashboard) are recorded the same way under Chirp’s own entry, which is never deleted. When you delete your account, your id in every one of these records is replaced with an anonymous placeholder: the month’s count is kept for billing, but nothing in it links back to you.

Other records on our servers

The copy above is a simple account. These records exist only while a step is in progress, or once you use the feature that needs them. Your download includes your personas, recovery-code counts, phones, identity verification, developer profile and billing state; the rest are not in it.

Our firewall’s request log is kept outside our database, and outside your copy. Requests to Chirp pass through a web application firewall (AWS WAF) that blocks floods and known attack patterns, and it logs each request: your IP address and the country it maps to, the time, the method and path, the request headers (your User-Agent among them), a fingerprint of your browser’s TLS connection, and what the firewall decided. It never logs your cookies, the Authorization header, the query string (where sign-in links carry their one-time codes) or the request body. We keep it to investigate and block abuse. Only our operators, with access to our AWS account, can read it, and each entry is deleted after 30 days.

Stored only on your device

These live on your laptop, phone, or hardware key, and never reach our servers.

Not stored anywhere

Why we collect it

Only to operate the sign-in service: authenticate you, issue tokens to the application you chose, let you manage your sessions and passkeys, prevent abuse, and respond to security incidents. We do not sell, share, or use this data for advertising or profiling.

Who we share it with

When you complete a sign-in to a relying application, we issue that application an ID token containing only a pairwise subject identifier (unique to that application) and the standard OIDC claims. We never share your email address with the application — there is no email scope and the token carries no email claim. The relying application then becomes a separate data controller for what it does with the identifier — check its own privacy policy.

We use a small number of providers as data processors: Amazon Web Services (compute and storage), Route 53 (DNS), Resend (sending our emails: sign-in links and the other messages described in these policies), Cloudflare (Turnstile, the bot check on the sign-in form), Stripe (developer billing, and ID verification if you choose it) and Google’s Firebase Cloud Messaging (notifications to phones that get your approval requests). Resend receives the recipient address and the message it delivers. Cloudflare receives your IP address, with what its check observes in your browser, when you submit the sign-in form. Stripe receives a developer’s sign-in email address when they first subscribe; card details go to Stripe directly and never reach us. Firebase receives each approving phone’s push token and the notification we send it: what is waiting for approval, and the ids of the request and of your account. They process data on our instructions; they do not receive your data for their own use.

How long we keep it

Account records (email, registered passkeys) are kept while your account exists. Sessions last up to 30 days from creation and stop working after 14 days unused; a session record is deleted automatically 30 days after creation, or when you sign out or revoke it. Security event logs (sign-in successes, failures, account changes) are kept for 14 days, or 90 days if the account they are filed under is on the Pro plan when they are recorded. Per-request diagnostic logs are kept for 14 days. The firewall’s request log (each request’s IP address, path and headers) is kept for 30 days. In-flight magic links expire and are deleted within 10 minutes. The other records listed above keep the lifetimes given with them; a ban outlasts the account it blocks. When you delete your account or a persona, the notices telling the apps you used (and any platform service that looked you up) to delete their copies are kept for up to 90 days after the deletion, with what lets our own services act on them, and are then deleted. Monthly sign-in records used for billing (which users signed in to a developer’s apps each month) have no automatic expiry; they are deleted when that developer deletes their account, and the record of sign-ins to Chirp itself is kept indefinitely. When you delete your account, your id in these records is replaced with an anonymous placeholder; only the count is kept, for billing.

Your choices

If you are in the EU/UK or California, the GDPR / CCPA give you specific rights (access, deletion, correction, portability). Deletion and an export of current account data are self-serve from your account page. The export page explains its coverage; for records outside that download or any request you can’t complete yourself, email privacy@chirpauth.com.

Cookies

We set one essential cookie: a random session token, used solely as a lookup key for your server-side session. It contains no personal information — not your email, not your name, not your account id, not even when it expires. We do not use analytics, advertising, or third-party cookies.

Here is exactly what the cookie looks like if you sign in as janesmith@example.com:

__Host-chirp_auth_session=bs_a3f7c891b4e84d2c9f6012345678901a_d4e5f6789012345678901234567890ab; Path=/; Max-Age=2592000; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax; Secure

Each piece broken out:

Key Value What it is Why it's here
__Host-chirp_auth_session bs_a3f7c891…90ab The cookie's name and opaque value. The __Host- prefix tells your browser to accept it only from this host, so no other site can plant one. The value is a 244-bit random server-side lookup key. Nothing about you (no email, no account id) is encoded in it.
Path / URL-path scope within the origin. Sent on every request to signin.chirpauth.com — never to other origins, never to the relying apps you sign in to.
Max-Age 2592000 Lifetime in seconds (30 days). Browser auto-deletes after. The server independently expires sessions after 14 days of inactivity, so an old cookie can stop working before this clock runs out.
HttpOnly — Hidden from JavaScript. Blocks the most common cookie-theft vector: a cross-site-scripting bug on any page reading the cookie via document.cookie.
SameSite Lax Cross-origin send rule. Sent on top-level navigations (so OIDC sign-in redirects work) but not on third-party POSTs (CSRF protection).
Secure — HTTPS-only. Cookie is never transmitted over plain HTTP.

When Jane signs out, we delete her session row from the server and instruct her browser to clear the cookie. The token stops working immediately, even if a copy of it had been intercepted somewhere — because the lookup target is gone.

Security

All traffic is HTTPS. Magic links are short-lived. Passkey private keys never leave your device. We rotate signing keys and publish JWKS at /.well-known/openid-configuration. To report a security issue, email security@chirpauth.com (also listed in /.well-known/security.txt).

Changes

If we change this policy in a way that materially expands what we collect or share, we’ll update the date above and notify active accounts by email at least 14 days before the change takes effect.