Privacy
in plain text.
Last updated 2026-11-20. Chirp is operated by Stackwell Labs LLC. Questions: privacy@chirpauth.com.
What we collect
There are three places data can live: on our servers, on your device, or nowhere. Here's what is in each.
Stored on our servers
Here is everything we would return if you asked for a copy of your data, after signing up as janesmith@example.com, registering a passkey, signing into one app, and using the service for a few minutes. In our database the same information is split across several rows; we have combined it here for clarity.
{
"user": {
"user_id": "usr_a3f7c891b4e84d2c9f6012345678901a",
"email": "janesmith@example.com",
"created_at": "2026-05-28T21:14:00Z"
},
"passkeys": [
{
"passkey_id": "pk_a3f7c891b4e84d2c9f6012345678901a",
"derived_name": "Passkey on macOS",
"custom_label": null,
"public_key": "MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgK...",
"created_at": "2026-05-28T21:15:00Z",
"last_used_at": "2026-05-28T22:30:00Z"
}
],
"sessions": [
{
"token": "bs_a3f7c891...90ab",
"created_at": "2026-05-28T21:14:00Z",
"last_seen_at": "2026-05-28T22:30:00Z",
"expires_at": "2026-06-27T21:14:00Z"
}
],
"consents": [
{
"app_id": "pigeon",
"app_name": "Pigeon",
"scopes": ["openid"],
"approved_at": "2026-05-28T21:16:00Z"
}
],
"events": [
{
"event": "login.success",
"at": "2026-05-28T21:14:00Z",
"result": "success",
"detail": "id_token",
"trace_id": "trc_d2f3e4..."
},
{
"event": "login.email_step.started",
"at": "2026-05-28T21:13:50Z",
"detail": ""
}
]
}
Each field broken out:
| Field | Example | What it is | How long |
|---|---|---|---|
| user.user_id | usr_a3f7c891… | Opaque random account id. Internal stable handle that survives email changes; not derived from your email. | Until you delete your account. |
| user.email | janesmith@example.com | The identifier you sign in with. Where we send magic-link emails. | Until you delete your account. |
| user.created_at | 2026-05-28T21:14:00Z | When you first signed up. | Until you delete your account. |
| passkeys[] | { derived_name, custom_label, public_key, dates } | A passkey you registered. derived_name is auto-set at registration time to one of a small fixed list ("Passkey on macOS", "Passkey on iOS", etc.), computed from the OS family in your User-Agent. The raw User-Agent is read once for this and then discarded. custom_label is null by default; only populated if you explicitly rename the passkey on the account page. The public key is what we verify your sign-in signatures against; the private key never leaves your device. |
Until you remove the passkey. |
| sessions[] | { token, method, dates } | A browser session record — one per browser you have signed in from. Lets you stay signed in and lets you list and revoke sessions. method is how you signed in (email link, passkey, phone approval or recovery code), so you can tell your sign-ins apart. No IP or browser fingerprint is attached. |
30 days absolute, 14-day idle — whichever first. |
| consents[] | { app_id, app_name, scopes, approved_at } | A relying app you have approved, its name when you last signed in to it, and the scopes you granted. Saved so we do not re-prompt on every sign-in, and so your connected apps can still name an app after its developer retires it. | Until you revoke consent. |
| events[] (security) | { event, at, result, detail, trace_id } | Sign-ins, account changes, passkey additions, changes to apps you own, etc. For incident response, and so you can see what was done on your account: the events filed under it are in your account export and at GET /api/account/activity. detail is a short note: a fixed token like "id_token" or "resend", sometimes with ids such as an account id or an app’s client id. Never an email address, IP or browser fingerprint. |
14 days, or 90 days for events recorded while the account they are filed under is on the Pro plan. |
| events[] (trace) | { event, at, detail } | Per-request diagnostic trace, for debugging when something goes wrong. The trace id (shown on error pages) is the storage key, not a stored field. No IP or browser fingerprint. | 14 days. |
| pending_magic_link (transient) | not present in this snapshot | A row that exists only between your clicking "send me a sign-in link" and your clicking the link in the email. Lets us verify the click came from the right inbox. | Usable more than once within the window, then deleted after 10 minutes — not consumed when you click it. |
| rate_limit_counter (transient) | RL#login.email#sha256(your_ip)#1748468040 | A per-IP counter that lets us reject brute-force sign-in floods. Your IP is SHA-256 hashed before becoming part of the key; the counter never holds the raw IP. | Auto-deleted after 2 minutes. |
| monthly_active (billing) | your export lists the months you were counted, never which developers counted you | For each developer, the set of user ids that signed in to any of their apps in a calendar month (UTC). It is how paid tiers are counted and capped in monthly active identities. Your opaque id only — no email, no timestamps, no count of sign-ins. | No automatic expiry. Deleted when that developer deletes their Chirp account. Sign-ins to Chirp itself (your account page or dashboard) are recorded the same way under Chirp’s own entry, which is never deleted. When you delete your account, your id in every one of these records is replaced with an anonymous placeholder: the month’s count is kept for billing, but nothing in it links back to you. |
Other records on our servers
The copy above is a simple account. These records exist only while a step is in progress, or once you use the feature that needs them. Your download includes your personas, recovery-code counts, phones, identity verification, developer profile and billing state; the rest are not in it.
- Sign-in steps in progress. While you sign in to an app, approve a sign-in on your phone or on another device, add a passkey, confirm a sensitive change, or create or upgrade an account, we keep a record of that step: which app asked, a one-time challenge or code, and, once we know who you are, your account id, the id the app will receive for you, the display name you chose and, for an email-link account, your email address. A phone sign-in also keeps the asking browser’s name (such as “Chrome on macOS”) so your phone can show it. Each expires within 15 minutes, and most are deleted as soon as the step finishes.
- An app’s access token. After you sign in to an app, it can ask us who you are with a token. We keep which app holds the token and the id that app has for you, for 12 hours or until the app revokes it.
- Recovery codes. A one-way hash of each code and when it was used, never the codes themselves. Until you make new codes or delete your account.
- Personas. The name you chose for each persona, its colour and when you made it. Until you delete the persona or your account.
- Phones that get your approval requests. Each phone’s push token (the address we send its notifications to), its platform (Android or iOS) and when you added it. Until you remove the phone or delete your account; we keep at most 10 and drop the oldest.
- A change you reported. If you answer “not me” to one of our security notices, which notice and when, so your account page can ask you to review your passkeys. Until you dismiss that on your account page or delete your account.
- Identity verification. If you verify a government ID with Stripe Identity, Stripe’s references for the verification and its report, when you passed, and a lookup from Stripe’s reference to your account. Never your date of birth or the document. Until you delete your account.
- Email delivery records. For each email we send you, our email provider’s message id, the sign-in it belongs to, and what the provider reports back (delivered, or bounced and the bounce type). Never your address. 30 days.
- Replies an app didn’t take. If you reply in Pigeon to an app’s message and the app’s server refuses it after repeated tries, we keep which app, the reply’s id and the message it answers, and the error, so it can be sent again. Never the reply’s text. 30 days, or until it goes through.
- Private apps. If a developer adds you to their private app, the id that app has for you, a label the developer gives you (such as your name) and the date. Until the developer removes you, retires the app, or you delete your account. An invite link they make holds only the app and that label, and is deleted once used or after 7 days.
- Bans. If we ban an account for abuse: the date and our reason, filed under a SHA-256 hash of its email address (email-link accounts) or under its account id (passkey accounts). A ban outlasts the account’s deletion, so the same person can’t sign up again, and is kept until we lift it.
- Deletion notices. When you delete your account or a persona, we tell each app you used it with, so the app can delete what it holds about you. We also tell each trusted platform service that looked you up from your sign-in to another app: while your account exists, we keep which services did and the id each looked up, so we know whom to tell. A notice holds, for each app or service, only the id it knows you by, when the deletion happened, and whether the notice has reached it. Our own services that know you by your account id, not an app’s id, act on a notice by asking us whose account that id belonged to, so for each id in a notice we also keep the deleted account’s id. Both are deleted 90 days after the deletion.
- Developer accounts. If you become a developer: when, and who invited you; your plan and its status, with your Stripe customer and subscription ids; when your apps first went over your plan’s limit, if they have; and the keys we sign your test tokens with. Until you delete your account.
Our firewall’s request log is kept outside our database, and outside your copy. Requests to Chirp pass through a web application firewall (AWS WAF) that blocks floods and known attack patterns, and it logs each request: your IP address and the country it maps to, the time, the method and path, the request headers (your User-Agent among them), a fingerprint of your browser’s TLS connection, and what the firewall decided. It never logs your cookies, the Authorization header, the query string (where sign-in links carry their one-time codes) or the request body. We keep it to investigate and block abuse. Only our operators, with access to our AWS account, can read it, and each entry is deleted after 30 days.
Stored only on your device
These live on your laptop, phone, or hardware key, and never reach our servers.
- Your passkey private keys — generated by your device, kept in the operating system's keychain or on a hardware security key (Touch ID, Windows Hello, a FIDO2 USB key). Chirp never sees them. We could not sign in as you even if our database were copied tomorrow: the cryptographic proof requires the private key, which we don't have.
- The session cookie — we generate a random token when you sign in and send it to your browser, which stores it for up to 30 days. It contains no information about you (see "Cookies" below for the full walkthrough). We don't track which physical device holds the cookie; we only know that requests arrive carrying tokens that map to sessions in our database.
- Cached pages and fonts — your browser caches our HTML, CSS, and font files the same way it caches any website. Not personal data; just bytes your browser saves to avoid re-downloading.
Not stored anywhere
- A password. Chirp has no passwords. Nothing to forget, leak, or crack.
- Your full IP address, outside the firewall log. Our code uses your IP for per-IP rate limiting during sign-in attempts, and passes it to Cloudflare’s bot check when you submit the sign-in form (see “Who we share it with”), then discards it. The only trace it leaves in our database is the 2-minute SHA-256 hash described above, which auto-deletes. The firewall’s request log above is the only place we keep your raw IP.
- Your browser's User-Agent header, outside the firewall log. Your browser sends it on every request, but our code only reads it in four specific places. When you register a passkey, it derives a name like "Passkey on macOS" from a fixed list of OS families. When you sign up, sign in or recover with a code, it maps it to one OS family and one browser family from fixed lists (such as "iOS" and "Safari") and adds one to an anonymous count of how many such attempts succeed or fail, which says nothing about who you are. When you sign in on a new browser, or ask to sign in by approving on your phone, it names the browser the same way (such as "Chrome on macOS"), so the alert or your phone can show which browser it was; a phone sign-in keeps that name for its 5 minutes. Our database never holds the raw User-Agent string; the firewall’s request log above is the only place it is kept.
- The contents of your email inbox beyond the magic-link emails we sent you.
- Your activity inside the apps you sign into. Once we issue an authorization code and the relying app takes over, we don't see what you read, click, or write on that app. What it does with you is governed by its own privacy policy.
Why we collect it
Only to operate the sign-in service: authenticate you, issue tokens to the application you chose, let you manage your sessions and passkeys, prevent abuse, and respond to security incidents. We do not sell, share, or use this data for advertising or profiling.
Who we share it with
When you complete a sign-in to a relying application, we issue that application an ID token containing only a pairwise subject identifier (unique to that application) and the standard OIDC claims. We never share your email address with the application — there is no email scope and the token carries no email claim. The relying application then becomes a separate data controller for what it does with the identifier — check its own privacy policy.
We use a small number of providers as data processors: Amazon Web Services (compute and storage), Route 53 (DNS), Resend (sending our emails: sign-in links and the other messages described in these policies), Cloudflare (Turnstile, the bot check on the sign-in form), Stripe (developer billing, and ID verification if you choose it) and Google’s Firebase Cloud Messaging (notifications to phones that get your approval requests). Resend receives the recipient address and the message it delivers. Cloudflare receives your IP address, with what its check observes in your browser, when you submit the sign-in form. Stripe receives a developer’s sign-in email address when they first subscribe; card details go to Stripe directly and never reach us. Firebase receives each approving phone’s push token and the notification we send it: what is waiting for approval, and the ids of the request and of your account. They process data on our instructions; they do not receive your data for their own use.
How long we keep it
Account records (email, registered passkeys) are kept while your account exists. Sessions last up to 30 days from creation and stop working after 14 days unused; a session record is deleted automatically 30 days after creation, or when you sign out or revoke it. Security event logs (sign-in successes, failures, account changes) are kept for 14 days, or 90 days if the account they are filed under is on the Pro plan when they are recorded. Per-request diagnostic logs are kept for 14 days. The firewall’s request log (each request’s IP address, path and headers) is kept for 30 days. In-flight magic links expire and are deleted within 10 minutes. The other records listed above keep the lifetimes given with them; a ban outlasts the account it blocks. When you delete your account or a persona, the notices telling the apps you used (and any platform service that looked you up) to delete their copies are kept for up to 90 days after the deletion, with what lets our own services act on them, and are then deleted. Monthly sign-in records used for billing (which users signed in to a developer’s apps each month) have no automatic expiry; they are deleted when that developer deletes their account, and the record of sign-ins to Chirp itself is kept indefinitely. When you delete your account, your id in these records is replaced with an anonymous placeholder; only the count is kept, for billing.
Your choices
- See your sessions: visit your account page.
- Sign out everywhere: revoke all sessions from the same page.
- Delete your account: do it yourself from your account page — choose “Delete your account”, confirm once, and we erase your record and all associated sessions, passkeys, and consents on the spot. No email-us-to-erase ritual. If your account is blocked from self-deletion (for example because it still owns registered apps), email privacy@chirpauth.com and we’ll handle it.
- Access a copy of your data: download it yourself from /account/export — you may be asked to confirm it’s you first.
If you are in the EU/UK or California, the GDPR / CCPA give you specific rights (access, deletion, correction, portability). Deletion and an export of current account data are self-serve from your account page. The export page explains its coverage; for records outside that download or any request you can’t complete yourself, email privacy@chirpauth.com.
Cookies
We set one essential cookie: a random session token, used solely as a lookup key for your server-side session. It contains no personal information — not your email, not your name, not your account id, not even when it expires. We do not use analytics, advertising, or third-party cookies.
Here is exactly what the cookie looks like if you sign in as janesmith@example.com:
__Host-chirp_auth_session=bs_a3f7c891b4e84d2c9f6012345678901a_d4e5f6789012345678901234567890ab; Path=/; Max-Age=2592000; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax; Secure
Each piece broken out:
| Key | Value | What it is | Why it's here |
|---|---|---|---|
| __Host-chirp_auth_session | bs_a3f7c891…90ab | The cookie's name and opaque value. The __Host- prefix tells your browser to accept it only from this host, so no other site can plant one. |
The value is a 244-bit random server-side lookup key. Nothing about you (no email, no account id) is encoded in it. |
| Path | / | URL-path scope within the origin. | Sent on every request to signin.chirpauth.com — never to other origins, never to the relying apps you sign in to. |
| Max-Age | 2592000 | Lifetime in seconds (30 days). | Browser auto-deletes after. The server independently expires sessions after 14 days of inactivity, so an old cookie can stop working before this clock runs out. |
| HttpOnly | — | Hidden from JavaScript. | Blocks the most common cookie-theft vector: a cross-site-scripting bug on any page reading the cookie via document.cookie. |
| SameSite | Lax | Cross-origin send rule. | Sent on top-level navigations (so OIDC sign-in redirects work) but not on third-party POSTs (CSRF protection). |
| Secure | — | HTTPS-only. | Cookie is never transmitted over plain HTTP. |
When Jane signs out, we delete her session row from the server and instruct her browser to clear the cookie. The token stops working immediately, even if a copy of it had been intercepted somewhere — because the lookup target is gone.
Security
All traffic is HTTPS. Magic links are short-lived. Passkey private keys never leave your device. We rotate signing keys and publish JWKS at /.well-known/openid-configuration. To report a security issue, email security@chirpauth.com (also listed in /.well-known/security.txt).
Changes
If we change this policy in a way that materially expands what we collect or share, we’ll update the date above and notify active accounts by email at least 14 days before the change takes effect.